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Abstract
This article seeks to outline the main elements in the historiographical 
controversy over the significance of ‘Spinozism’ as an eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment category and the validity or otherwise of the concept of ‘Radical 
Enlightenment’ as well as the relationship between these two categories. Defining 
‘Radical Enlightenment’ as the philosophical rejection of religious authority 
combined with a democratic tending system of social and political thought, 
and as a partly clandestine tradition that evolved in opposition to the moderate 
mainstream Enlightenment, it seeks to sketch in the main features both of the 
‘negative critique’ broadly opposing this way of understanding the Western 
Enlightenment and the ‘positive critique’ that accepts this classification in broad 
outline. 
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Resumen
En el presente artículo se aspira a resumir los principales elementos de 
la controversia historiográfica acerca del significado de “Spinozismo” como 
categoría de la Ilustración del siglo XVIII y de la validez o no del concepto de 
“Ilustración Radical”, así como la relación entre ambas categorías. Al definir 
la “Ilustración Radical” como el rechazo filosófico de la autoridad religiosa, 
en combinación con un sistema de pensamiento social y político que propende 
a la democracia, y como una tradición en parte clandestina desarrollada en 
oposición a la corriente principal de la Ilustración, más moderada, el texto 
pretende bosquejar en sus rasgos distintivos tanto la “crítica negativa”, 
fuertemente opuesta a ese modo de entender la Ilustración Occidental, como la 
“crítica positiva”, que la acepta ampliamente.
Palabras-clave: ateísmo, deísmo, “Spinozismo”, “secta de los spinozistas”, 
“neospinozistas”, ‘cercle spinoziste’, neo-epicureísmo, Ilustración Radical, 
‘Radikale Aufklärung’, Ilustración moderada, ‘above reason’, anti-escrituralismo.
As early as the 1670s, and continually, right through the eighteenth century, 
one finds numerous references in the contemporary controversial literature, 
theological, philosophical and historical, in all the Western European countries, 
to ‘Spinoza’ as supposedly the foremost and most dangerous of the ‘atheists’ 
threatening Christianity, society and the moral order generally, and the ‘sect of 
Spinozists’ specifically as the veritable hard-core of the libertine underground 
challenging all the structures of authority then in place.
It is fairly clear that there were two main reasons for this remarkable 
historical phenomenon. One was Spinoza’s Bible criticism. Hobbes and 
other thinkers venturing into the field of Bible criticism preceded Spinoza in 
challenging the sacred character of Scripture and denying that the Pentateuch was 
of Mosaic origin, developing a powerful and sophisticated ‘anti-Scripturalism’, 
“but no-one,” as the point was made by Spinoza’s contemporary, the Zurich 
scholar Johann Heinrich Heidegger (1633-98), among the most eminent Swiss 
theologians of the age and one of those keenest to unite all the Swiss Reformed 
churches behind a relatively undogmatic compromise creed, “struck the 
foundations of the entire Pentateuch more disgracefully than Spinoza,” or did 
so with greater audacia [sed nemo Spinoza indignius fundamenta Pentateuchi 
totius concussit.].2 Denying the possibility of miracles, contending that 
everything, without exception, including the origins of life and the principles 
2 Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Exercitationes Biblicae, Capelli, Simonis, Spinozae et aliorum sive 
aberrationibus, sive fraudibus oppositae (Zurich, 1700), 304, 369, 385.
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of morality, is governed exclusively by unalterable and mathematically 
precise natural laws without any divine intervention, or knowing providence, 
benevolent or otherwise, remained wholly illicit in mainstream society and no 
other thinker so clearly stated or was so regularly associated with this forbidden 
viewpoint as Spinoza. 
The second reason why Spinoza alone occupies this remarkable and 
extraordinary position in early modern Western culture was that no other 
thinker was considered to have systematized ‘atheism’ so as to turn it into a 
working philosophy to the same extent or as effectively as Spinoza. If there 
were, and had long been, many, philosophical ‘atheists’ publicly condemned 
as such, stretching back, via Vanini, to Epicurus and Lucretius, “je crois qu’il 
[i.e. Spinoza] est le premier,” writes Bayle in his Dictionnaire, “qui ait réduit 
en système l’athéisme, et qui en ait fait un corps de doctrine lié et tissu selon 
les manières des geomètres…”, a pronouncement that itself became immensely 
influential through the rest of the Enlightenment.3 As the Cambridge don, 
Brampton Gurdon (d.1741), son of a Suffolk gentleman and member of 
Parliament, expressed this point (following Bayle), in 1723, “Spinoza is the 
only person among the modern Atheists, that has pretended to give us a regular 
scheme of Atheism, and therefore I cannot act unfairly in making him the 
representative of their party, and in proving the weakness and absurdities of the 
atheistick scheme, by shewing the faults of his.”4 Criticism of the existing order 
of things using ‘atheistic’ ideas as a tool to demolish accepted thinking long 
remained the exclusive speciality of a forbidden ‘underground’ philosophy 
associated with Spinoza’s name rather than any other.   
Although proclaiming Spinoza the chief and most prominent 
‘representative’ of the underground atheistic tradition supposedly striving to 
undermine the main structures of authority underpinning Christendom has 
an astoundingly long history, from 1673 when we first encounter this notion 
that Spinozism was a forbidden philosophy being promoted, first in Holland, 
by an underground sect of disciples,5 called ‘spinozistes’, continuing down to 
the 1820s, roughly lasting a century and a half, modern historians took very 
little interest in this striking phenomenon until the question became tied to the 
(since 2001) highly divisive issue of ‘Radical Enlightenment’. The remarkable 
historiographical and philosophical controversy over the role of Spinoza and 
Spinozism in the Western Enlightenment generally sparked by the debate over 
‘Radical Enlightenment’ since 2001, instead of receding after some years, as 
3  Françoise Charles-Daubert and Pierre-François Moreau (eds.), Pierre Bayle. Écrits sur Spinoza 
(Paris, 1983), p. 29.
4  Brampton Gurdon, The Pretended Difficulties in Natural or Reveal’d religion No Excuse for 
Infidelity (London, 1723), p. 86.
5  Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(Oxford, 2001), p. 278.
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one might expect from the normal course of historiographical controversies, 
has been escalating for more than a decade now especially since 2009, in a 
dramatic fashion. 
Recent developments in the discussion reveal the very wide scope and 
implications of this debate.  No-one will dispute, I think, that the ‘Radical 
Enlightenment controversy’ entered a new and more mature stage during 
2017 with the appearance of two valuable collections of essays, one edited 
by the Belgian scholar Steffen Ducheyne, in Brussels, the other edited in 
Paris and Madrid by the Spanish intellectual historian, Marta García-Alonso, 
each offering an overview of the whole controversy and providing a balanced 
impression of the range of conflicting views and the kinds of intellectual 
issues and questions at stake. These two overviews are Steffen Ducheyne (ed.) 
Reassessing the Radical Enlightenment (London, 2017) and Marta García-
Alonso, Les Lumières radicales et le politique (Paris, 2017). 
But even before 2017 there had already been several earlier attempts 
to provide a broad perspective on this now highly complex ‘Radical 
Enlightenment’ controversy, notably the volume of essays Qu’est-ce que les 
Lumières “radicales”. Libertinage, athéisme et spinozisme dans le tournant 
philosophique de l’âge classique (Paris, 2007),6 followed by the special issue 
of the Bordeaux journal Lumières (no. 22) entitled Lumières radicales et franc-
maçonnerie comprising seven contributions, published, in 2013,7  and, for the 
German public, the volume Radikalaufklärung, edited by Martin Muslow and 
myself, published by Suhrkamp, in Berlin, in 2014. However, before one can 
ponder the question of Spinoza’s role and the meaning of the term ‘Spinozists’ 
in the Radical Enlightenment in any balanced fashion, one must first note the 
role attributed to Spinoza in the ‘Radical Enlightenment thesis’ itself with 
somewhat more precision than is usually the case. The sizeable body of critics 
who broadly reject the thesis put forward in my series of volumes commencing 
in 2001 with Radical Enlightenment, are often satisfied with simply stating that 
my thesis claims the Radical Enlightenment ‘originated,’ as some express it, in 
and essentially revolved around, the philosophy of Spinoza. 
This way of expressing the point is trebly incorrect.8 In the first place, 
the term ‘Radical Enlightenment’, as I employ it, means combining rejection 
of religious authority with democratizing republican schemes for reforming 
society so that certain groups and individuals that were definitely, or possibly, 
not ‘Spinozists’ in any meaningful sense could nevertheless be part of the 
Radical Enlightenment. Among these non-Spinozist elements were radical 
6 Edited by Catherine Secrétan, Tristan Dagron and Laurent Bove.
7 Lumières 22/ 2 (2013): ‘Lumières radicales et franc-maçonnerie’ (ed.) by Cécile Revauger and 
Jean Mondot.
8 Jonathan Israel, ‘Radical Enlightenment’- a Game-changing Concept,’ in Steffen Ducheyne (ed.) 
Reassessing the Radical Enlightenment (London, 2017) pp. 15-47, here pp. 37-39.
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Socinians and Unitarians like Jarig Jelles and Joseph Priestley who rejected all 
religious authority and mysteries they deemed incompatible with philosophical-
scientific reason while at the same time espousing a democratic tendency. There 
were also certain ‘deists’, like Shaftesbury, who while meeting the criteria 
to be included under the rubric ‘Radical Enlightenment’ either expressly 
and genuinely repudiated Spinoza on moral or some other grounds or, like 
Mandeville, Franklin, Paine or Jefferson who thought of himself specifically as 
an ‘Epicurean,’ did not expressly, or altogether clearly reject the existence of a 
creator God separate from Nature.
In the second place, it goes against our argument to suggest that the 
‘Radical Enlightenment’ ‘originated’ in the philosophy of any one particular 
thinker. Rather, Radical Enlightenment was an intellectual tradition, a group 
project, that began among a particular circle in a particular place, the cercle 
spinoziste, with important contributions to what evolved into ‘Spinozism’ 
as a historical category being made, in many cases before Spinoza himself 
published anything, by Franciscus van den Enden, Adriaen Koerbagh, 
Lodewijk Meyer, the Brothers De La Court, and several others.9 One of the few 
commentators to fully appreciate the significance of this qualification, Pierre-
François Moreau, noting that this circle, flourishing in Holland in the 1660s 
and 1670s, was sometimes more republican, more democratic, more hostile 
to religion and more libertarian, than Spinoza himself, perceptively asked, not 
without an ironic touch: “was Spinoza then a ‘Spinozist’?10 Moreau went on 
to throw doubt on whether Spinoza does evince a ‘revolutionary impulse,’ and 
to question whether the “Spinozist conception of the common good” promotes 
a political and social revolution based on the ‘general will’ and the cause of 
equality. This has been a topic of some dispute among Spinoza specialists in 
recent years and my viewpoint is probably not going to be readily accepted 
by some, or most  others. Nevertheless, there are cogent grounds for arguing 
that Spinoza was a deliberate political as well as religious subversive and that 
what disappointed him about the English Revolution of the 1640s, for example, 
was not that King Charles lost his head, something that utterly horrified most 
Dutchmen at the time, but rather that the outcome was so paltry- essentially 
just Cromwell whom he dismisses as just another ’king’ (that is tyrant), under 
another name. 
But even if those critics who think that Spinoza disapproved of violent 
revolutionary upheavals as such, a point open to  dispute,  are right, that  would 
not of itself negate the argument that his basic position entails fundamental 
opposition to kings and narrow oligarchies tied to rejecting religious authority. 
9 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, pp. 175-274.
10 Pierre-François Moreau, ‘Spinoza est-il spinoziste?” in Catherine Secrétan, Tristan Dagron and 
Laurent Bove (eds.) Qu’est-ce que les “Lumières radicales”?, pp. 289-97, here pp. 292-293
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While a broad, lasting opposition movement that exerts a major historical 
impact over a long period, like the Radical Enlightenment, must draw its 
vitality, impetus, durability and even ultimately its meaning from the social, 
economic and political context in which it flourishes, rather than from any 
thinker’s or thinkers’ ideas,11 it can, in one sense, ‘originate’ in the philosophy 
of a small group at a particular time if the initial intellectual articulation of the 
movement clearly commenced there. Radical Enlightenment was preceded by a 
long tradition of underground intellectual currents, including Neo-Epicreanism 
and Averroism , stretching back many centuries, and must have ‘originated’ 
in this broader sense  in concrete historical realities, and a widespread social 
sense of grievance, as well as earlier debates; nevertheless, it is consistent with 
acknowledging this wider context, to maintain that the Radical Enlightenment’s 
distinctive format, rejection of religious authority combined with democratizing 
republicanism, its arguments and intellectual orientation, commenced at a 
particular moment and in a particular place, in this instance a small group in 
Holland, the friends, allies and associates of Spinoza.  
A third and final qualification to the notion of ‘originated’ needs to be 
noted. The Radical Enlightenment thesis as presented in my work does not 
claim that the late seventeenth and eighteenth century historical phenomenon 
contemporaries labeled ‘Spinozism’ or the ‘sect of Spinozists’ was necessarily 
steeped in, or closely tied, to Spinoza’s own philosophy directly.  It is by no 
means the intention to dispute the conclusion of the classic monograph of Paul 
Vernière, first published in 1954, that the leading French radicals of the High 
Enlightenment era - Diderot, d’Holbach, Helvétius, and Condorcet – mostly 
had only a fleeting, superficial knowledge of Spinoza’s texts and rarely cite 
him directly, that Spinoza’s philosophy as such ceased to be well-known or 
intensively studied after around 1730, before reviving again strongly, in 
Germany first, from the 1780s.12 What is meant by calling Diderot and his 
clan spinozistes, or neoSpinozists, is that unlike some other radicals, such as 
Shaftesbury or Priestley, they not only tied rejection of religious authority 
to a crypto-republican rejection of the social and political status quo, but 
comprehensively espoused philosophical necessitarianism, determinism, one-
substance doctrine, anti-Scripturalism, the principle that morality is purely a 
social tool invented by men that must reconcile individual self-interest with 
the common interest, and that priestly oppression inherently functions hand in 
hand with political tyranny.
While it is patently not the case that key figures such as d’Holbach 
and Condorcet delved deeply into Spinoza’s thought, or cited him often or 
11 Israel, “Radical Enlightenment - a Game-changing Concept”, pp. 36-40.
12  Paul Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Revolution (1954; 2nd edn. 1982), pp. 
699-700. 
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in some cases ever, at the same time, one must acknowledge that the key 
elements constituting High Enlightenment French ‘Spinozisme’ in the sense 
intended here were not discovered or concocted by these post-1740 writers and 
thinkers but were transmitted to them by those sections of the pre-1730 radical 
philosophical underground literature, especially clandestine manuscripts and 
suppressed printed books, that were more directly immersed in Spinoza’s own 
texts and thought. Those who performed this bridging role transmitting the 
basic elements of ‘Spinozism’ to the generation of Diderot and d’Holbach 
consisted of two distinct coteries. On the one hand there were those English 
‘deists’, Toland, Tindal and Collins especially, who rejected Locke’s dualism 
and principle of ‘supra rationem’ and adopted instead seemingly directly from, 
or else in emulation of, Spinoza, the latter’s one-substance doctrine based on the 
idea that motion is inherent in matter, his necessitarianism, anti-Scripturalism 
and attack on ‘priestcraft’ along with his plea for full freedom of conscience 
and expression, or ‘freedom to philosophize’. Secondly, there were a group of 
subversive Huguenot and other French thinkers in the years around 1700, and 
down to the 1730s, whether or not they themselves can accurately be called 
‘Spinozists’, who were deeply preoccupied with Spinoza’s texts and bequeathed 
a powerful philosophical impetus to the generation of Diderot and d’Holbach. 
Especially important for the transmission of Spinozist ideas in France, and the 
literary depicting of an underground sect of ‘Spinozists’ pervading the whole 
of European culture, were Bayle, Boulainvilliers, and d’Argens but there were 
many others in this group, Tyssot de Patot among them.
Misunderstanding or misconstruing the argument, several proponents of 
the ‘negative critique’ as I shall henceforth refer to those scholars who oppose 
the basic narrative presented here (including Margaret Jacob),13 have seized 
one or other feature of this transmission process, supposing that it offers 
a reliable argument against the ‘Spinozist’ Radical Enlightenment thesis. 
The classic instance here is d’Holbach’s indubitable and substantial debt to 
Toland.14 Margaret Jacob, for example, was  right to point to the connection 
13   The major critiques rejecting the Radical Enlightenment thesis as presented in my volumes are 
those of Antoine Lilti, Anthony La Vopa, Johnson Kent Wright, Keith Michael Baker, Harvey Chisick, 
Samuel Moyn, Dale Van Kley, Ursula Goldenbaum, Darryn McMahon, Annelien De Dijn, Jeremy 
Popkin, Paolo Casini, Ann Thomson,  Carolina Armenteros, Theo Verbeeck, Dan Edelstein, Vincenzo 
Ferrone, Helena Rosenblatt, Joanne Stalnaker, Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob, David Bell, and Eduardo 
Tortarolo;  among the foremost summaries presenting their arguments are: Antoine Lilti, “Comment 
écrit-on l’histoire intellectuelle des Lumières? Spinozisme, radicalisme et philosophie” Annales. 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales (2009), 171-206; A.J. La Vopa, ‘A New Intellectual History? Jonathan 
Israel’s Enlightenment’, Historical Journal 52 (2009), 717-38; and Harvey Chisick, “Interpreting 
the Enlightenment”, The European Legacy, (2008), 35-57; for four particularly hostile interventions 
against the ‘Radical Enlightenment’ thesis’s approach to the French Revolution, see H-France Forum, 
vol. 9 issue 1 (Winter 2014) no. 5; for a recent overview of the whole debate in Italian see Carlo 
Borghero, Interpretazioni, categorie, finzioni. Narrare la storia della filosofia (Florence, 2017), 311-
28, 505-507.
14  Margaret Jacob, Radical Enlightenment. Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (revised 2nd 
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between Toland and d’Holbach but mistaken in thinking that this implies that 
‘Spinozism’ was not at the root of d’Holbach’s radicalism. For recent research 
into Toland, the work of Ian Leask in particular, has recently powerfully 
reinforced the proposition that Toland’s rejection of Locke’s dualism and 
‘supra rationem’ and his Bible criticism and attack on priestcraft are much more 
firmly rooted in Spinoza and Spinozism than historians have been accustomed 
to think. As regards Toland, “one of the most significant Anglophone writers 
of the period,” affirms Leask, “the extent of a general Spinozistic influence 
has been – if anything- under-determined and under-appreciated [even by 
Israel].”15 While rejecting Locke’s supra rationem and asserting one-substance 
materialism are Toland’s key philosophical moves, concludes Leask, it is clear 
that “Toland remains committed throughout his writings, to the (thoroughly 
Spinozistic) dictum that the sole significance of Christianity is its universal, 
intelligible, moral precepts.”16 
Broadly, the ‘negative critique’ rejects and opposes the thesis that the 
materialist, one-substance ‘Radical Enlightenment’ constituted a coherent 
tradition over generations or fundamentally divided the Enlightenment into 
clearly opposing tendencies, ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’.17  Prima facie, the 
negative critique looks particularly weak in this regard, as it is obvious that 
it is totally impossible to sustain such a case on the basis of hard evidence. 
Despite this, many scholars steadfastly refuse to acknowledge any such rift as 
the essential key to understanding the inner dynamics and ultimate trajectory 
of the Enlightenment and the ensuing political revolutions of the 1775-1848 
era, and this rejectionism gains added tenacity from the fact that their stance 
fits much better than does the approach I am offering both with the existing 
traditional historiography which makes no such fundamental distinction 
between moderate and Radical Enlightenment and also with Postmodernism 
which still lingers in favour with some.  
A stock objection routinely presented by the ‘negative critique’ is the 
claim, insisted on first by Piet Stuurman, in 2002, that there is no necessary 
connection between democratic republicanism and rejection of religious 
authority, no inherent link between philosophical monism ruling out miracles, 
revelation and divine governance of history and revolutionary political ideas.18 
edn., 2003), p. 20, p. 154, p. 286; Borghero, Interpretazioni, categorie, pp. 23-24, p. 113, p. 323.
15  Ian Leask, ‘Speaking for Spinoza? Notes on John Toland’s Origines Judaicae’ in Ducheyene, 
Reassessing, pp. 143-59, here p. 144; see also Ian Leask, ‘The Undivulged Even in Toland’s 
Christianity Not Mysterious’ in W. Hudson, Diego Lucci and J.R.Wigelsworth (eds.) Atheism and 
Deism Revalued. Heterodox Religious Identities in Britain, 1650-1800 (Farnham, Surrey, 2014), pp. 
63-80 and Ian Leask, ‘Unholy Force: Toland’s Leibnizian “Consummation” of Spinozism,” in British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2012), pp. 499-537.
16    Leask, ‘Unidivulged Event’, p. 79.
17  See  Ducheyne, Reasssessing the Radical Enlightenment, and Marta García-Alonso, Les 
Lumières radicales et le politique. Études critiques sur les travaux de Jonathan Israel (Paris, 2017).     
18     Piet Stuurman, ‘Pathways to the Enlightenment’,  History Workshop Journal  54 (2002), pp. 
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This objection still appears weighty to many. But it is actually rather hard to 
see why. Asserting divine governance of the world and the need for priestly 
intercession to interpret and explain that ‘governance’, was undeniably the 
best available pillar for both royal power and aristocratic and ecclesiastical 
privilege. The facts again clearly show the incontestable role of religion in 
upholding hierarchical social systems and ecclesiastical privilege with the result 
that it is no coincidence that in the late eighteenth century most revolutionary 
democrats whether French, American, British or German were in fact atheists 
or non-providential deists. That both the pre-1789 texts denying religious 
authority and those denying social hierarchy relied on evasive techniques to 
get published, on a degree of clandestinity to develop, was an additional shared 
element –  intellectual and social. 
Clandestinity was a key integral feature of major sections of the French 
Enlightenment as in the rest of Europe but clearly had, or came to have, a 
dual function, masking both rejection of religious authority and, most notably 
during the ‘war of the Encyclopédie‘, masking incipient republicanism and 
anti-aristocratism.19 Furthermore – and here Carl Schmitt becomes especially 
relevant - any anti-democratic principle of sovereignty emphatically not of the 
people or for the people, conceiving the essence of state as serving a higher 
order entirely superior to the people, cannot dispense with a religious or semi-
secularized ‘political theology’ to explain why the people’s individual and 
collective interests should be subordinated to a supposedly higher and more 
authoritarian schema. Carl Schmitt saw Spinoza’s greatest crime against 
authoritarian forms of government of the sort he advocated as his attempt, 
in contrast to Hobbes, decisively to expand the private sphere and individual 
liberty at the expense of state power.20 In this respect, there is indeed a 
Schmittian strand, or counter-strand, to our Radical Enlightenment thesis. All 
these considerations together sufficiently indicate that the main contentions of 
the ‘negative critique’, no matter how forcefully expressed- and sometimes the 
critics are rather virulent-  simply miss the point. 
Meanwhile, as the polemic has developed over the years, the “positive 
critique” countering the ‘negative critique’, has simultaneously evolved, with 
Giuseppe Ricuperati, Winfried Schröder, Sonja Lavaert, Matthew Stewart, 
227-35; Harvey Chisick, ‘Review Essay’, in H-France Forum vol. 9 (issue 1, Winter 2014), pp. 59-
60; Karen Green, A History of Women’s Political Thought in Europe, 1700-1800 (Cambridge, 2014), 
pp. 6-10.            
19  This entire topic of the clandestine philosophical literature is omitted from the recent Cambridge 
Companion to the French Enlightenment a work where Fontenelle and Fréret are not even mentioned 
in the index and that is comprehensively inadequate in almost every respect, see, Daniel Brewer (ed.) 
The Cambridge Companion to The French Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2014).
20  Jeffrey Bernstein, “Nature’s God” as Deus sive Natura: Spinoza, Jefferson, and the Historical 
Transmission of the Theological-Political Question’, in Dustin Gish and Daniel Klinghard (eds.) 
Resistance to Tyrants, Obedience to God. Reason, Religion and Republicanism at the American 
Founding (Lanham, Maryland, 2013) pp. 77-78.
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Charles Devellennes, María José Villaverde, Wayne Hudson, Maxime Rovere, 
Ian Leaske, Martha García-Alonso, Landon Frim, and Richard Wolin, among 
its chief proponents.21 The ‘positive critique’, contradicting the ‘negative 
critique’, broadly accepts the categories set out here envisaging the ‘Radical 
Enlightenment’ as a tendency closely linking rejection of religious authority 
with political and social revolutionary subversion tending toward democratic 
republicanism. The ‘positive critique’ broadly agrees that combining elimination 
of religious authority with democratizing republicanism produced a sweeping 
reform program aspiring to replace all prevailing principles of religion, morality, 
politics, social organization and education with a new general outlook rooted 
in materialist (or pantheist) monist philosophy. Such philosophy grounded an 
ideology that grew to become far more comprehensively revolutionary than the 
Enlightenment’s public face, its moderate ‘mainstream’ rival, and shaped the 
universalist principles underlying the great declarations and legislation of the 
American and French revolutions. While asserting the Radical Enlightenment’s 
reality as a clandestine underground that took root in various parts of Europe 
over a considerable span of time, Martin Mulsow’s important divergent 
perspective differs from that presented here mainly, in denying the continuity 
and consistency of the Radical Enlightenment’s philosophical ground-plan, 
playing down the democratic republican dimension, and the ‘Spinozism’ and 
focusing chiefly on the assault on Revelation and religious authority. It differs 
too in stressing the tradition’s inconsistencies, unintended consequences, 
mystical elements, and group patterns. 
The historiography of the Radical Enlightenment, the reader should 
also note (since the negative critique usually seems unaware of the precise 
background) reaches back well before the 1980s. The conservative German 
Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss (1899-1973) who first introduced the concept 
‘Radical Enlightenment’ into scholarly discussion, in the 1920s,22 viewed 
the Enlightenment-era phenomenon as deeply embedded in a far older, 
more variegated philosophical, social and cultural underground especially 
21 Notable contributions since 2009, include Philipp Blom, A Wicked Company: The Forgotten 
Radicalism of the European Enlightenment (2010); Matthew Stuart, Nature’s God. The Heretical 
Origins of the American Republic (New York, 2014); Winfried Schröder, ‘‘Radical Enlightenment 
from a Philosophical Perspective’ in Frank Grunert (ed.) Concepts of (Radical) Enlightenment. 
Jonathan Israel in Discussion in the Series: IZEA (Interdisziplinäre Zentrum für die Erforschung 
der Europäischen Aufklãrung, Halle), Kleine Schriften no. 5 (Halle, 2014) (2014), pp. 44-51; Sonja 
Lavaert, ‘Radical Enlightenment, Enlightened Subversion, and Spinoza‘, Philosophica 89 (2014), 
pp. 49-102; and the essays in J.I. Israel and Martin Mulsow (eds.) Radikalaufklärung (Berlin 2014) 
especially those of Mulsow, Paganini, Silvia Berti, Wiep van Bunge, Antony McKenna, and Wilfried 
Schröder. Additional substantive contributors to the ‘positive critique’ are Wolin, Wayne Hudson, 
Charles Devellennes, Marta Garcia Alonso, Maria José Villaverde, Landon Frim, Nick Nesbitt, Ian 
Leask and Anthony DeSantis.   
22 On the origins of the term ‘Radical Enlightenment’ see Frederik Stjernfelt, “Radical 
Enlightenment”: aspects of the history of a term’, in Ducheyne (ed.) Reassessing, 80-103, here pp. 
95-98.
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Epicureanism and late medieval Averroism and, differently from my own 
elaboration of the Radical Enlightenment since 2001, bracketed together the 
entire ‘atheistic’ tradition linking the Hellenistic world to modern times as 
constituting, or tending towards ‘Radikale Aufklärung’ [Radical Enlightenment], 
which in Strauss’s view was indeed essentially ‘atheism.’ He saw it as a tendency 
that had existed in rudimentary form for centuries by the time we reach the 
early Enlightenment era. In my own approach, by contrast, the term ‘Radical 
Enlightenment,” is strictly reserved for the phenomenon combining rejection 
of religious authority with sweeping political and social reformism, observable 
first in the Netherlands from around 1660, and only afterwards in England and 
France. In Germany, as described by Martin Muslow, Radical Enlightenment 
viewed as a fresh impulse tying the attack on religion to elements of sweeping 
social reformism first became discernible, from around 1680.23  
The thesis that the Enlightenment had two main strands, moderate and 
radical with only the latter being genuinely anti-religious and secular, first 
introduced in a developed, argued, fashion, by Strauss, in the 1920s,24 entailed 
a philosophical bifurcation of the Enlightenment that was subsequently further 
developed by Strauss himself, Günter Mühlpfordt,25 Henry May, Giuseppe 
Ricuperati, Margaret Jacob (who, however, largely rejects the interpretation 
presented here), Silvia Berti, and Wim Klever. What he termed ‘Radikale 
Aufklärung’ [Radical Enlightenment], Strauss envisaged as preceding the 
‘Moderate Enlightenment’ chronologically but also as outliving it. From 
the late seventeenth century onwards, ‘Moderate Enlightenment’ may have 
remained the principal reforming project in the eyes of governments, churches 
and educators and has remained so in the minds of most philosophers and 
historians ever since, but beneath the surface, in terms of effective arguments, 
held Strauss, the radical impulse proved sturdier philosophically and culturally, 
and in the long run showed itself to be the ‘real’ or principal Enlightenment, not 
least in shaping the Enlightenment’s troubled legacy, the intellectual paradoxes 
and dilemmas of post-1800 modernity.26 
23 Miguel Benítez, Le Foyer clandestin des Lumières. Nouvelles recherches sur les manuscrits 
clandestins (2 vols., Paris, 2013) i, 13; Martin Mulsow, Enlightenment Underground. Radical 
Germany, 1680-1720 (Charlottesville, Virginia, 2015) , pp. 2-3, p. 16, p. 19, p. 24; Martin Mulsow, 
Prekäres Wissen. Eine andere Ideengeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit (Berlin, 2012) , p. 34, p. 45.
24  Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1930; new English edn., Chicago, 1997), 35; Smith, 
Spinoza’s Book of Life, 191; Nicolas Dubos rightly noted, in 2009, that when writing my earlier 
Enlightenment volumes I was still unaware that the radical-moderate dichotomy in Enlightenment 
historiography commences with Strauss in the 1920s, see Dubos, ‘Hobbes et les Lumières radicales’, 
in Secrétan, Dagron and Bove (eds.) Qu’est-ce que les “Lumières radicales”?, pp. 38-41.
25  For republished articles of Mühlpfortdt’s from the 1970s and 1980s, see, Günter Mühlpfordt, 
Halle- Leipziger Aufklärung. Kernstuck der Mitteldeutschen Aufklärung (Halle, 2011).         
26  On the Radical Enlightenment in America, see the books of Henry May, Matthew Stewart, Garry 
Nash, Seth Cotlar, Sean Wilentz and also my Expanding Blaze. How the American Revolution Ignited 
the World, 1775-1848 (Princeton, 2017).
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In fact, Strauss unhesitatingly classified Radikale Aufklärung as the 
veritable Enlightenment as well as essentially ‘atheistic’, while casting Locke, 
Voltaire, Montesquieu, Moses Mendelssohn and other apparently committed 
‘moderates’ in the role of cautious compromisers who, with their unworkable 
philosophical ‘fixes’, unwittingly weakened rather than strengthened their 
ultimately highly precarious and untenable dualist philosophical edifices, their 
insistent but ultimately unsuccessful efforts at reconciling reason with religion, 
and philosophical critique with kings and courts. Strauss first employed the term 
Radikale Aufklärung as part of a general reinterpretation of the Enlightenment 
on which he embarked while researching Spinoza’s Bible criticism in the 
mid- and late 1920s.27 Radikale Aufklärung to him was the Enlightenment’s 
true core. But since, for Strauss, the label signified above all ‘atheism’, he 
chiefly identified what by 1928 he already termed ‘Moderate Enlightenment’ 
in terms of the latter’s theistic premises and willingness to compromise with 
ecclesiastical authority.28 
Eliminating religious authority, Strauss knew, must have far-reaching 
political and social consequences, but he hardly anywhere discusses this 
dimension in the early modern context. While not attaching any specific political 
character to the intellectual tendency, Strauss did maintain, highly significantly, 
that Radikale Aufklärung is above all characterized by its purely naturalistic 
conception of science, philosophy, and knowledge, a naturalism that radicals 
deployed, not unlike Nietzsche later, in his middle period, to ruthlessly strip 
out all supernaturalia. The Radikale Aufklärung conceived as an intellectual 
tradition, as Strauss describes it, insisted their standpoint was more objectively 
true, more demonstrably verifiable, than alternative philosophies, being more 
concretely open to verification by reason and scientific observation than either 
the views of  Lockean moderates, like Voltaire, or traditionalist counter-
enlighteners, Christian or Jewish. 
Rejecting my thesis since it has developed (from 1993), a great many 
scholars agree with the charge that the ‘Spinozist’ ‘Radical Enlightenment 
thesis’ as I have presented it, is misconstrued and based on ‘shaky evidence.’ 
Some would call this the prevailing opinion among Enlightenment experts. 
This is the ‘negative critique’ consensus. What is often applauded as the most 
effective and systematic critique for demonstrating this, that offered by Antoine 
Lilti, centers on challenging my use of the term ‘Spinozism’. His very widely 
supported standpoint maintains that the use of the term spinozisme in eighteenth 
century France and western Europe generally is simply too elastic to sustain my 
broad conclusions in any meaningful way. Since Lilti’s arguments have been 
27  See infra pp.
28 Thomas Pangle, ‘The Light shed on the Crucial Development of Strauss’s Thought by his 
Correspondence with Gerhard Krűger’, in M. D. Yaffe and R.S. Ruderman (eds.) Reorientation: Leo 
Strauss in the1930s (New York, 2014), pp. 59-63.   
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seconded by numerous scholars, it is important for readers to realize  that there 
is a good deal of incoherence in this position which, indeed, when examined 
carefully seems altogether untenable. To agree with Lilti means arguing that 
even though writers all over Europe from around 1670 very frequently claimed 
that Spinoza and ‘Spinozism’ constituted the most audaciously formulated threat 
to religion and the existing moral order, and no other labels are used to refer 
to this universally menacing phenomenon to the same extent, contemporaries 
did not mean anything concrete by this, surely an intrinsically absurd position. 
Lilti is a leading proponent of Postmodernist deconstruction, instability 
of meanings, signification slippage and deep ambiguity, who wholly embraced 
Daniel Roche’s contention that in the eighteenth century Spinoza was 
interpreted in a bewildering variety of ways, rendering it impossible to see 
eighteenth-century ‘Spinozism’ as any kind of coherent tradition. Rather than a 
“theoretical corpus, Spinozism, contend Roche and Lilti, is just “un scandale, 
la figure extreme de l’héterotoxie,” a term irredeemably problematic.29 This 
contention is Lilti’s chief argument against the ‘Radical Enlightenment’ 
thesis, and an argument that fulfils a key function in the ‘negative critique’ 
more generally. But no matter how enamoured one may be with Postmodernist 
instability of meanings and signification slippage, absolutely nothing can make 
spinozisme as employed in Diderot’s Promenade and the Encyclopédie, or in 
High Enlightenment literature, compatible with Revelation,  divine providence, 
religious authority, theism, mysticism, fideism, eclecticism, moral relativism, 
Aristotelian substances, Platonic ideals, Prisca theologia (natural religion), 
Cartesian dualism, Lockean dualism based on supra rationem, double truth, 
fixity of species, Epicurean swerves, La Mettrie’s materialism, or skepticism. 
‘Spinozists’ a term already in very wide use, in Britain, Germany, France, 
and Italy, as well as Holland well before 1700, and ‘spinozisme’ as used in 
eighteenth-century France , can never mean, or  ever be blended with, any 
of these trends. It may not always be a rigorous philosophical-theological 
category. But it frequently was and Lilti’s and Roche’s idea that ‘spinozisme’ 
meant lots of different things to different people is assuredly just a ridiculous 
sleight of hand, of no conceivable value for historical analysis. 
To regard Voltaire’s repeated, specific, clear usage of the term spinozisme 
as being so elastic as to have little real meaning would be as ill-advised and 
foolish as to make this point with respect to Diderot, Lessing, Goethe, or Herder, 
indeed every case that matters. If Spinoza’s way of presenting his arguments, 
his ‘geometric method’, appeared “terribly archaic to Diderot” and the ‘new 
Spinozists’ of the 1750s, all these other figures, as Lilti himself concedes at one 
point, nevertheless intended “to follow [Spinoza] in the ‘consequences’ of his 
29 Lilti, ‘Comment écrit-on l’histoire intellectuelle’, 188-9, 192; Borghero, Interpetazioni, 
categorie, p. 506.
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system.” It is true that no-one has been more congratulated for his efforts to 
demolish the ‘Radical Enlightenment thesis’ than Lilti. Antonio Negri, labeled, 
his critique a “remarkable analysis’ that has indeed “demolished” that thesis.30 
But this only proves once again the pervasive weakness of the ‘negative 
critique,’ the extreme fragility of its critical effort which careful readers will 
encounter again and again.  
Contrary to Roche, Lilti, and here also Borghero, it makes no difference 
whether, as with Diderot’s specific usage in his Promenade, a writer has only 
skeletal, or  profound, knowledge of Spinoza’s texts, spinozisme wherever 
used during the Enlightenment cannot in any context ever meaningfully 
signify anything else but conflating body and soul into one, God and Nature 
into one, a universal morality based on the ‘common good’ and the laws of 
physics and rules of mathematics being conceived as one unified body of 
doctrine excluding divine providence and miracles whereby all reality, the 
entire universe, is governed by one single invariable set of unalterable laws of 
nature with no reserved area outside it. It always means the total extinction of 
theology in favour of philosophy and science; it always means Christianity is 
reduced to nothing more than universal moral precepts.31 Roche’s, Lilti’s and 
Borghero’s point may be very widely echoed, but it is going to be exceedingly 
difficult for supporters to show that it amounts to anything more than the most 
perfect Postmodernist fog of confusion, as profoundly misleading in every way 
with regard to Bayle and Toland,  as it has been shown to be, with regard to 
Spinoza.32
The intensity and scale of the present-day controversy reflects not so 
much the validity of arguments on either side – it is no easy task to find a 
criticism of the ‘negative critique’ which, on careful examination, might be 
tenable -  but rather its drastic implications and how much is at stake: the 
very fact so ‘virulent’ a contest has developed with accusations abounding of 
‘bias’, ‘unscholarly use of sources’, propensity to ‘idealism’, ‘essentialism’, 
‘reductionism’ and ‘rigidity’, as Vincenzo Ferrone commented, shows the 
essential points of dispute  remain  unsettled and that it will take time before 
final conclusions can be drawn.33
30 Antonio, Negri, Spinoza for our Time. Politics and Postmodernity (New York, 2013) , 17; 
Borghero, Interpetazioni, categorie, pp. 505-506.
31 Jonathan Israel,’L’Histoire intellectuelle des Lumières et de la Révolution: une incursion critique’ 
in La Lettre Clandestine  19 (2011), pp. 211-215.
32 Lilti, ‘How Do We Write the Intellectual History ?’ cue 55; Israel,’L’Histoire intellectuelle’, pp. 
209-210.
33 Vincenzo Ferrone, The Enlightenment. Histrory of an Idea (2010; English version, Princeton, 
2015), 162; Israel, ‘Radical Enlightenment – a game-changing concept’, p. 17.   
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